The text, viewed by Adnkronos, presented in the Senate by Menia: “It is essential to clearly identify the legal meaning of a human being”
Tick a new ‘pro-life’ bill in the Senate, this time branded Brothers of Italy. After the bill presented by Forza Italia at the beginning of the legislature comes that of Fdi Senator Roberto Menia, entitled “amendment of article 1 of the civil code regarding the recognition of legal capacity for every human being”. Objective of the bill – that in terms of content, it follows the October text, signed by Maurizio Gasparri – is “declaring that every man has the legal capacity as a man, that is, that legal subjectivity originates from conception, not from birth”, reads the bill, viewed by Adnkronos.
“It’s about recognize, even in the juridical field, that embryo, fetus, newborn, child, boy, adolescent, young, adult, elderly, old are different names which indicates an identical reality, an identical subject, the same personal being, the same man“, explains Menia in the presentation of the bill, underlining how “prenatal human life” is subjected “to risks of various kinds”. According to the rapporteur of the text, “a complete discipline of man’s manipulative intervention in the genetic “. “For this”, it reads, “the definition of the ‘legal status of the human embryo’ is preliminary, as also requested by the European Parliament in the two resolutions of 16 March 1989 on the ethical and legal problems of genetic engineering and artificial procreation Human”.
“Even in the field of abortion“, continues the Fdi senator, “it is essential to clearly identify the legal meaning of the human being in the youngest phase of his existence”. “If one recognizes – as did sentence n. 25 of 1975 of the Constitutional Court – that even the conceived has the right to lifeguaranteed at the constitutional level by article 2 of the Constitution (‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees human rights’), how can one exclude – already according to the positive law in force – legal subjectivity?”, asks Menia. The signatory of the text finally believes “that it does not have to intervene in the complex regulation of patrimonial rights linked to successions and donations”, for which “the elimination of the condition of birth would involve complex changes in the inheritance regime, which should be better evaluated”.